UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office



4 October 2001



Responsibility for the terrorist atrocities

This document does not purport to provide a prosecutable case against Usama

Bin Laden in a court of law. Intelligence often cannot be used evidentially,

due both to the strict rules of admissibility and to the need to protect the

safety of sources. But on the basis of all the information available HMG is

confident of its conclusions as expressed in this document.



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TERRORIST ATROCITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 11

SEPTEMBER 2001



INTRODUCTION



1. The clear conclusions reached by the government are:





Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida, the terrorist network which he heads, planned

and carried out the atrocities on 11 September 2001;



Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida retain the will and resources to carry out

further atrocities;



the United Kingdom, and United Kingdom nationals are potential targets; and



Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida were able to commit these atrocities because of

their close alliance with the Taleban régime, which allowed them to operate

with impunity in pursuing their terrorist activity.

2. The material in respect of 1998 and the USS Cole comes from indictments

and intelligence sources. The material in respect of 11 September comes from

intelligence and the criminal investigation to date. The details of some

aspects cannot be given, but the facts are clear from the intelligence.



3. The document does not contain the totality of the material known to HMG,

given the continuing and absolute need to protect intelligence sources.



SUMMARY



4. The relevant facts show:



Background





Al Qaida is a terrorist organisation with ties to a global network, which

has been in existence for over 10 years. It was founded, and has been led at

all times, by Usama Bin Laden.



Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida have been engaged in a jihad against the United

States, and its allies. One of their stated aims is the murder of US

citizens, and attacks on America’s allies.



Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida have been based in Afghanistan since 1996, but

have a network of operations throughout the world. The network includes

training camps, warehouses, communication facilities and commercial

operations able to raise significant sums of money to support its activity.

That activity includes substantial exploitation of the illegal drugs trade

from Afghanistan.



Usama Bin Laden’s Al Qaida and the Taleban régime have a close and mutually

dependent alliance. Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida provide the Taleban régime

with material, financial and military support. They jointly exploit the

drugs trade. The Taleban régime allows Bin Laden to operate his terrorist

training camps and activities from Afghanistan, protects him from attacks

from outside, and protects the drugs stockpiles. Usama Bin Laden could not

operate his terrorist activities without the alliance and support of the

Taleban régime. The Taleban’s strength would be seriously weakened without

Usama Bin Laden’s military and financial support.



Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida have the capability to execute major terrorist

attacks.



Usama Bin Laden has claimed credit for the attack on US soldiers in Somalia

in October 1993, which killed 18; for the attack on the US Embassies in

Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 which killed 224 and injured nearly 5000;

and were linked to the attack on the USS Cole on 12 October 2000, in which

17 crew members were killed and 40 others injured.



They have sought to acquire nuclear and chemical materials for use as

terrorist weapons.

In relation to the terrorist attacks on 11 September



5. After 11 September we learned that, not long before, Bin Laden had

indicated he was about to launch a major attack on America. The detailed

planning for the terrorist attacks of 11 September was carried out by one of

UBL’s close associates. Of the 19 hijackers involved in 11 September 2001,

it has already been established that at least three had links with Al Qaida.

The attacks on 11 September 2001 were similar in both their ambition and

intended impact to previous attacks undertaken by Usama Bin laden and Al

Qaida, and also had features in common. In particular:





Suicide attackers



Co-ordinated attacks on the same day



The aim to cause maximum American casualties



Total disregard for other casualties, including Muslim



Meticulous long-term planning



Absence of warning.

6. Al Qaida retains the capability and the will to make further attacks on

the US and its allies, including the United Kingdom.



7. Al Qaida gives no warning of terrorist attack.



THE FACTS



Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida



8. In 1989 Usama Bin Laden, and others, founded an international terrorist

group known as “Al Qaida” (the Base). At all times he has been the leader of

Al Qaida.



9. From 1989 until 1991 Usama Bin Laden was based in Afghanistan and

Peshawar, Pakistan. In 1991 he moved to Sudan, where he stayed until 1996.

In that year he returned to Afghanistan, where he remains.



The Taleban Regime



10. The Taleban emerged from the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan in the

early 1990s. By 1996 they had captured Kabul. They are still engaged in a

bloody civil war to control the whole of Afghanistan. They are led by Mullah

Omar.



11. In 1996 Usama Bin Laden moved back to Afghanistan. He established a

close relationship with Mullah Omar, and threw his support behind the

Taleban. Usama Bin Laden and the Taleban régime have a close alliance on

which both depend for their continued existence. They also share the same

religious values and vision.



12. Usama Bin Laden has provided the Taleban régime with troops, arms, and

money to fight the Northern Alliance. He is closely involved with Taleban

military training, planning and operations. He has representatives in the

Taleban military command structure. He has also given infrastruture

assistance and humanitarian aid. Forces under the control of Usama Bin Laden

have fought alongside the Taleban in the civil war in Afghanistan.



13. Omar has provided Bin Laden with a safe haven in which to operate, and

has allowed him to establish terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. They

jointly exploit the Afghan drugs trade. In return for active Al Qaida

support, the Taleban allow Al Qaida to operate freely, including planning,

training and preparing for terrorist activity. In addition the Taleban

provide security for the stockpiles of drugs.



14. Since 1996, when the Taleban captured Kabul, the United States

government has consistently raised with them a whole range of issues,

including humanitarian aid and terrorism. Well before 11 September 2001 they

had provided evidence to the Taleban of the responsibility of Al Qaida for

the terrorist attacks in East Africa. This evidence had been provided to

senior leaders of the Taleban at their request.



15. The United States government had made it clear to the Taleban regime

that Al Qaida had murdered US citizens, and planned to murder more. The US

offered to work with the Taleban to expel the terrorists from Afghanistan.

These talks, which have been continuing since 1996, have failed to produce

any results.



16. In June 2001, in the face of mounting evidence of the Al Qaida threat,

the United States warned the Taleban that it had the right to defend itself

and that it would hold the régime responsible for attacks against US

citizens by terrorists sheltered in Afghanistan.



17. In this, the United States had the support of the United Nations. The

Security Council, in Resolution 1267, condemned Usama Bin Laden for

sponsoring international terrorism and operating a network of terrorist

camps, and demanded that the Taleban surrender Usama Bin Laden without

further delay so that he could be brought to justice.



18. Despite the evidence provided by the US of the responsibility of Usama

Bin Laden and Al Qaida for the 1998 East Africa bombings, despite the

accurately perceived threats of further atrocities, and despite the demands

of the United Nations, the Taleban régime responded by saying no evidence

existed against Usama Bin Laden, and that neither he nor his network would

be expelled.



19. A former Government official in Afghanistan has described the Taleban

and Usama Bin Laden as “two sides of the same coin: Usama cannot exist in

Afghanistan without the Taleban and the Taleban cannot exist without Usama.”



Al Qaida



20. Al Qaida is dedicated to opposing ‘un-Islamic’ governments in Muslim

countries with force and violence.



21. Al Qaida virulently opposes the United States. Usama Bin Laden has urged

and incited his followers to kill American citizens, in the most unequivocal

terms.



22. On 12 October 1996 he issued a declaration of jihad as follows:



“The people of Islam have suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice

imposed by the Zionist-Crusader alliance and their collaborators . . .

It is the duty now on every tribe in the Arabian peninsula to fight jihad

and cleanse the land from these Crusader occupiers. Their wealth is booty to

those who kill them.



My Muslim brothers: your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two

Holy Places (i.e. Saudi Arabia) are calling upon your help and asking you to

take part in fighting against the enemy – the Americans and the Israelis.

They are asking you to do whatever you can to expel the enemies out of the

sanctities of Islam.”



Later in the same year he said that



“terrorising the American occupiers (of Islamic Holy Places) is a religious

and logical obligation.”

In February 1998 he issued and signed a ‘fatwa’ which included a decree to

all Muslims:



“. . . the killing of Americans and their civilian and military allies is a

religious duty for each and every Muslim to be carried out in whichever

country they are until Al Aqsa mosque has been liberated from their grasp

and until their armies have left Muslim lands.”

In the same ‘fatwa’ he called on Muslim scholars and their leaders and their

youths to



“launch an attack on the American soldiers of Satan.”

and concluded:



“We – with God’s help – call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes

to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill Americans and plunder

their money whenever and wherever they find it. We also call on Muslims . .

. to launch the raid on Satan’s US troops and the devil’s supporters allying

with them, and to displace those who are behind them.”

When asked, in 1998, about obtaining chemical or nuclear weapons he said



“acquiring such weapons for the defence of Muslims (was) a religious duty.”

In an interview aired on Al Jazira (Doha, Qatar) television he stated:



“Our enemy is every American male, whether he is directly fighting us or

paying taxes.”

In two interviews broadcast on US television in 1997 and 1998 he referred to

the terrorists who carried out the earlier attack on the World Trade Center

in 1993 as “role models”. He went on to exhort his followers “to take the

fighting to America.”



23. From the early 1990s Usama Bin Laden has sought to obtain nuclear and

chemical materials for use as weapons of terror.



24. Although US targets are Al Qaida’s priority, it also explicitly

threatens the United States’ allies. References to “Zionist-Crusader

alliance and their collaborators,” and to “Satan’s US troops and the devil’s

supporters allying with them” are references which unquestionably include

the United Kingdom.



25. There is a continuing threat. Based on our experience of the way the

network has operated in the past, other cells, like those that carried out

the terrorist attacks on 11 September, must be assumed to exist.



26. Al Qaida functions both on its own and through a network of other

terrorist organisations. These include Egyptian Islamic Jihad and other

north African Islamic extremist terrorist groups, and a number of other

jihadi groups in other countries including the Sudan, Yemen, Somalia,

Pakistan and India. Al Qaida also maintains cells and personnel in a number

of other countries to facilitate its activities.



27. Usama Bin Laden heads the Al Qaida network. Below him is a body known as

the Shura, which includes representatives of other terrorist groups, such as

Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Ayman Zawahiri and prominent lieutenants of

Bin Laden such as Abu Hafs Al-Masri. Egyptian Islamic Jihad has, in effect,

merged with Al Qaida.



28. In addition to the Shura, Al Qaida has several groups dealing with

military, media, financial and Islamic issues.



29. Mohamed Atef is a member of the group that deals with military and

terrorist operations. His duties include principal responsibility for

training Al Qaida members.



30. Members of Al Qaida must make a pledge of allegiance to follow the

orders of Usama Bin Laden.



31. A great deal of evidence about Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida has been

made available in the US indictment for earlier crimes.



32. Since 1989, Usama Bin Laden has conducted substantial financial and

business transactions on behalf of Al Qaida and in pursuit of its goals.

These include purchasing land for training camps, purchasing warehouses for

the storage of items, including explosives, purchasing communications and

electronics equipment, and transporting currency and weapons to members of

Al Qaida and associated terrorist groups in countries throughout the world.



33. Since 1989 Usama Bin Laden has provided training camps and guest houses

in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Sudan, Somalia and Kenya for the use of Al

Qaida and associated terrorist groups. We know from intelligence that there

are currently at least a dozen camps across Afghanistan, of which at least

four are used for training terrorists.



34. Since 1989, Usama Bin Laden has established a series of businesses to

provide income for Al Qaida, and to provide cover for the procurement of

explosives, weapons and chemicals, and for the travel of Al Qaida

operatives. The businesses have included a holding company known as ‘Wadi Al

Aqiq’, a construction business known as ‘Al Hijra’, an agricultural business

known as ‘Al Themar Al Mubaraka’, and investment companies known as ‘Ladin

International’ and ‘Taba Investments’.



Usama Bin Laden and previous attacks



35. In 1992 and 1993 Mohamed Atef travelled to Somalia on several occasions

for the purpose of organising violence against United States and United

Nations troops then stationed in Somalia. On each occasion he reported back

to Usama Bin Laden, at his base in the Riyadh district of Khartoum.



36. In the spring of 1993 Atef, Saif al Adel, another senior member of Al

Qaida, and other members began to provide military training to Somali tribes

for the purpose of fighting the United Nations forces.



37. On 3 and 4 October 1993 operatives of Al Qaida participated in the

attack on US military personnel serving in Somalia as part of the operation

‘Restore Hope.’ Eighteen US military personnel were killed in the attack.



38. From 1993 members of Al Qaida began to live in Nairobi and set up

businesses there, including Asma Ltd, and Tanzanite King. They were

regularly visited there by senior members of Al Qaida, in particular by Atef

and Abu Ubadiah al Banshiri.



39. Beginning in the latter part of 1993, members of Al Qaida in Kenya began

to discuss the possibility of attacking the US Embassy in Nairobi in

retaliation for US participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Ali

Mohamed, a US citizen and admitted member of Al Qaida, surveyed the US

Embassy as a possible target for a terrorist attack. He took photographs and

made sketches, which he presented to Usama Bin Laden while Bin Laden was in

Sudan. He also admitted that he had trained terrorists for Al Qaida in

Afghanistan in the early 1990s, and that those whom he trained included many

involved in the East African bombings in August 1998.



40. In June or July 1998, two Al Qaida operatives, Fahid Mohammed Ali Msalam

and Sheik Ahmed Salim Swedan, purchased a Toyota truck and made various

alterations to the back of the truck.



41. In early August 1998, operatives of Al Qaida gathered in 43, New Runda

Estates, Nairobi to execute the bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi.



42. On 7 August 1998, Assam, a Saudi national and Al Qaida operative, drove

the Toyota truck to the US embassy. There was a large bomb in the back of

the truck.



43. Also in the truck was Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al ‘Owali, another Saudi. He,

by his own confession, was an Al Qaida operative, who from about 1996 had

been trained in Al Qaida camps in Afghanistan in explosives, hijacking,

kidnapping, assassination and intelligence techniques. With Usama Bin Laden’

s express permission, he fought alongside the Taleban in Afghanistan. He had

met Usama Bin Laden personally in 1996 and asked for another ‘mission.’

Usama Bin Laden sent him to East Africa after extensive specialised training

at camps in Afghanistan.



44. As the truck approached the Embassy, Al ’Owali got out and threw a stun

grenade at a security guard. Assam drove the truck up to the rear of the

embassy. He got out and then detonated the bomb, which demolished a

multi-storey secretarial college and severely damaged the US embassy, and

the Co-operative bank building. The bomb killed 213 people and injured 4500.

Assam was killed in the explosion.



45. Al ‘Owali expected the mission to end in his death. He had been willing

to die for Al Qaida. But at the last minute he ran away from the bomb truck

and survived. He had no money, passport or plan to escape after the mission,

because he had expected to die.



46. After a few days, he called a telephone number in Yemen to have money

transferred to him in Kenya. The number he rang in Yemen was contacted by

Usama Bin Laden’s phone on the same day as Al ‘Owali was arranging to get

the money.



47. Another person arrested in connection with the Nairobi bombing was

Mohamed Sadeek Odeh. He admitted to his involvement. He identified the

principal participants in the bombing. He named three other persons, all of

whom were Al Qaida or Egyptian Islamic Jihad members.



48. In Dar es Salaam the same day, at about the same time, operatives of Al

Qaida detonated a bomb at the US embassy, killing 11 people. The Al Qaida

operatives involved included Mustafa Mohamed Fadhil and Khaflan Khamis

Mohamed. The bomb was carried in a Nissan Atlas truck, which Ahmed Khfaklan

Ghailani and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, two Al Qaida operatives, had

purchased in July 1998, in Dar es Salaam.



49. Khaflan Khamis Mohamed was arrested for the bombing. He admitted

membership of Al Qaida, and implicated other members of Al Qaida in the

bombing.



50. On 7 and 8 August 1998, two other members of Al Qaida disseminated

claims of responsibility for the two bombings by sending faxes to media

organisations in Paris, Doha in Qatar, and Dubai in the United Arab

Emirates.



51. Additional evidence of the involvement of Al Qaida in the East African

bombings came from a search conducted in London of several residences and

businesses belonging to Al Qaida and Egyptian Islamic Jihad members. In

those searches a number of documents were found including claims of

responsibility for the East African bombings in the name of a fictitious

group, ‘the Islamic Army for the liberation of the Holy Places.’



52. Al ‘Owali, the would-be suicide bomber, admitted he was told to make a

videotape of himself using the name of the same fictitious group.



53. The faxed claims of responsibility were traced to a telephone number,

which had been in contact with Usama Bin Laden’s cell phone. The claims

disseminated to the press were clearly written by someone familiar with the

conspiracy. They stated that the bombings had been carried out by two Saudis

in Kenya, and one Egyptian in Dar es Salaam. They were probably sent before

the bombings had even taken place. They referred to two Saudis dying in the

Nairobi attack. In fact, because Al ‘Owali fled at the last minute, only one

Saudi died.



54. On 22 December 1998 Usama Bin Laden was asked by Time magazine whether

he was responsible for the August 1998 attacks. He replied:



“The International Islamic Jihad Front for the jihad against the US and

Israel has, by the grace of God, issued a crystal clear fatwa calling on the

Islamic nation to carry on Jihad aimed at liberating the holy sites. The

nation of Mohammed has responded to this appeal. If instigation for jihad

against the Jews and the Americans . . . is considered to be a crime, then

let history be a witness that I am a criminal. Our job is to instigate and,

by the grace of God, we did that, and certain people responded to this

instigation.”

He was asked if he knew the attackers:



“. . . those who risked their lives to earn the pleasure of God are real

men. They managed to rid the Islamic nation of disgrace. We hold them in the

highest esteem.”

And what the US could expect of him:



“. . . any thief or criminal who enters another country to steal should

expect to be exposed to murder at any time . . . The US knows that I have

attacked it, by the grace of God, for more than ten years now . . . God

knows that we have been pleased by the killing of American soldiers (in

Somalia in 1993). This was achieved by the grace of God and the efforts of

the mujahideen . . . Hostility towards America is a religious duty and we

hope to be rewarded for it by God. I am confident that Muslims will be able

to end the legend of the so-called superpower that is America.”

55. In December 1999 a terrorist cell linked to Al Qaida was discovered

trying to carry out attacks inside the United States. An Algerian, Ahmed

Ressam, was stopped at the US-Canadian border and over 100 lbs of bomb

making material was found in his car. Ressam admitted he was planning to set

off a large bomb at Los Angeles International airport on New Year’s Day. He

said that he had received terrorist training at Al Qaida camps in

Afghanistan and then been instructed to go abroad and kill US civilians and

military personnel.



56. On 3 January 2000, a group of Al Qaida members, and other terrorists who

had trained in Al Qaida camps in Afghanistan, attempted to attack a US

destroyer with a small boat loaded with explosives. Their boat sank,

aborting the attack.



57. On 12 October 2000, however, the USS Cole was struck by an

explosive-laden boat while refuelling in Aden harbour. Seventeen crew were

killed, and 40 injured.



58. Several of the perpetrators of the Cole attack (mostly Yemenis and

Saudis) were trained at Usama Bin Laden’s camps in Afghanistan. Al ‘Owali

has identified the two commanders of the attack on the USS Cole as having

participated in the planning and preparation for the East African embassy

bombings.



59. In the months before the September 11 attacks, propaganda videos were

distributed throughout the Middle East and Muslim world by Al Qaida, in

which Usama Bin Laden and others were shown encouraging Muslims to attack

American and Jewish targets.



60. Similar videos, extolling violence against the United States and other

targets, were distributed before the East African embassy attacks in August

1998.



Usama Bin Laden and the 11 September attacks



61. Nineteen men have been identified as the hijackers from the passenger

lists of the four planes hijacked on 11 September 2001. At least three of

them have already been positively identified as associates of Al Qaida. One

has been identified as playing key roles in both the East African embassy

attacks and the USS Cole attack. Investigations continue into the

backgrounds of all the hijackers.



62. From intelligence sources, the following facts have been established

subsequent to 11 September; for intelligence reasons, the names of

associates, though known, are not given.





In the run-up to 11 September, bin Laden was mounting a concerted propaganda

campaign amongst like-minded groups of people – including videos and

documentation – justifying attacks on Jewish and American targets; and

claiming that those who died in the course of them were carrying out God’s

work.



We have learned, subsequent to 11 September, that Bin Laden himself asserted

shortly before 11 September that he was preparing a major attack on America.



In August and early September close associates of Bin Laden were warned to

return to Afghanistan from other parts of the world by 10 September.



Immediately prior to 11 September some known associates of Bin Laden were

naming the date for action as on or around 11 September.



Since 11 September we have learned that one of Bin Laden’s closest and most

senior associates was responsible for the detailed planning of the attacks.



There is evidence of a very specific nature relating to the guilt of Bin

Laden and his associates that is too sensitive to release.

63. Usama Bin Laden remains in charge, and the mastermind, of Al Qaida. In

Al Qaida, an operation on the scale of the 11 September attacks would have

been approved by Usama Bin Laden himself.



64. The modus operandi of 11 September was entirely consistent with previous

attacks. Al Qaida’s record of atrocities is characterised by meticulous long

term planning, a desire to inflict mass casualties, suicide bombers, and

multiple simultaneous attacks.



65. The attacks of 11 September 2001 are entirely consistent with the scale

and sophistication of the planning which went into the attacks on the East

African Embassies and the USS Cole. No warnings were given for these three

attacks, just as there was none on 11 September.



66. Al Qaida operatives, in evidence given in the East African Embassy bomb

trials, have described how the group spends years preparing for an attack.

They conduct repeated surveillance, patiently gather materials, and identify

and vet operatives, who have the skills to participate in the attack and the

willingness to die for their cause.



67. The operatives involved in the 11 September atrocities attended flight

schools, used flight simulators to study the controls of larger aircraft and

placed potential airports and routes under surveillance.



68. Al Qaida’s attacks are characterised by total disregard for innocent

lives, including Muslims. In an interview after the East African bombings,

Usama Bin Laden insisted that the need to attack the United States excused

the killing of other innocent civilians, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.



69. No other organisation has both the motivation and the capability to

carry out attacks like those of the 11 September – only the Al Qaida network

under Usama Bin Laden.



Conclusion



70. The attacks of the 11 September 2001 were planned and carried out by Al

Qaida, an organisation whose head is Usama Bin Laden. That organisation has

the will, and the resources, to execute further attacks of similar scale.

Both the United States and its close allies are targets for such attacks.

The attack could not have occurred without the alliance between the Taleban

and Usama Bin Laden, which allowed Bin Laden to operate freely in

Afghanistan, promoting, planning and executing terrorist activity.

How terrorists hide messages online

http://www.knoxstudio.com/shns/story.cfm?pk=SIEGE-INVISIBLE-10-04-01&cat=WW



By LISA HOFFMAN

Scripps Howard News Service

October 04, 2001



- To terrorist cells such as Al Qaeda, a picture on the Web can be worth

thousands of words.



Employing the 21st century version of a concept as old as secrets

themselves, alleged terrorists affiliated with Osama bin Laden are believed

to have exploited the vastness of the Internet to hide messages between

conspirators in what amounts to plain sight.



According to declassified intelligence reports, court testimony and computer

security experts, bin Laden's network has been a pioneer in adapting the

ancient art of steganography to the Internet. U.S. officials and high-tech

researchers seeking to counter such techniques are scrambling for methods to

detect or derail them.



Online steganography - derived from the Greek words meaning "covered

writing" - essentially involves hiding information or communications inside

something so unremarkable that no one would suspect it's there. It's the

cyber-equivalent of invisible ink or the "dead drops" that spies use to pass

secrets.



Experts say Al Qaeda, along with the Palestinian terrorist groups Hezbollah

and Hamas, have used computer software available for free on the Internet to

communicate via virtually undetectable messages embedded electronically

within innocuous photographs or music files of the sort that millions of

Internet users send to each other each day.



Using it as a ruse, bin Laden's terror operatives allegedly have been able

to bury maps, diagrams, photos of targets and messages within popular music,

auction and sports sites as well as pornographic chat rooms - incongruous

territory for devout Muslim fundamentalists.



Secrets even can be hidden in spam, the millions of unwanted e-mail messages

ricocheting daily across the Internet that barely register with most users

before they delete them. Communicating this way makes it extraordinarily

difficult for law enforcement to pick up on, much less interdict or trace.



"The sender can transmit a message without ever communicating directly with

the receiver. There is no e-mail between them, no remote logins, no instant

messages," wrote Bruce Schneier of Counterpane Internet Security.

"Steganography is a good way for terrorist cells to communicate... without

any group knowing the identity of the other."



It's an old concept, written about in 474 B.C. by Greek historian Herodotus,

who described how Histiaeus of Miletus shaved the head of a slave and

tattooed a secret message on his scalp. When the slave's hair grew back,

Histiaeus dispatched him to the Greeks, who shaved the slave's head and read

the message.



During World War II, invisible ink was used by all sides. And the Germans

perfected the use of "microdots," in which a page of writing could be

reduced to the size of a dot on a letter - only to be enlarged by the

recipients and read.



Computer steganography essentially piggy-backs information on empty or

unimportant spaces in digital files. But those who want to employ the method

don't need to understand the complex concepts at work - all they have to do

is download software available free or for less than $50 from more than two

dozen Internet sites.



Follow the instructions for using the software and, with a few mouse clicks,

you've hidden a message that is all but undetectable, except by the person

you have tipped to where to find it.



Photo or music files with such messages embedded are indistinguishable to

the human eye or ear from identical ones lacking the secret data. (For an

example of how this works, go to http://www.spammimic.com, and embed your

own message in spam.)



That fact exponentially increases the difficulty for investigators trying to

track terrorist communications online. "With the volume of documents,

photos, video and sound files moving on the Internet, there is no system

powerful enough to analyze every object for hidden messages," wrote Barry

Collin(CQ), research fellow at the National Interagency Civil-Military

Institute of the National Guard Bureau.



And an interceptor can be hamstrung even more if the hidden message is

encrypted into code. Bin Laden's network allegedly does just that.



The Justice Department, citing the difficulty of monitoring and detecting

cyber-communications among terrorists, is asking Capitol Hill to relax legal

restrictions or force software writers to supply their secrecy code "keys"

to the government in order to make it easier for agents to tap into everyday

e-mail on a broad hunt for miscreants and de-scramble what they find.



Civil libertarians say such privacy invasions are unnecessary; efforts

should be directed instead toward techniques to detect and disable

cyber-steganography.



The intelligence community is hard at work with university researchers

creating sophisticated detection programs that use complex algorithms to

conduct statistical tests capable of identifying stenographic footprints.



One new software package of interest to the Air Force was developed by

research professor Jessica Fridrich at Binghamton University in New York

state. Called "Securestego," it allows a user to return a digital image

modified by steganography to its original state - that could derail such a

message before it could reach its intended receiver.

U.S. Senator Wants Tech 'National Guard'; IM Firm Says It Was Warned of Attacks

By Jay Lyman

www.NewsFactor.com,

Part of the NewsFactor Network

September 28, 2001



Odigo vice president of marketing Alex Diamandis told NewsFactor that two people at Odigo's Israeli offices received instant messages regarding the terrorist attacks on the U.S. about two hours before they happened.



Citing the severe stress on the nation's communications and technology infrastructure brought by the September 11th terrorist attacks, U.S. Senator Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) is proposing a National Guard-style corps of volunteer information-technology professionals and equipment to be ready for trouble.



Wyden, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, announced his proposed tech corps on the Senate floor Wednesday and is planning to meet with government agencies and technology firms next week to promote the idea.



"As we seek to prevent future disasters, we must still prepare to meet them," Wyden told the other senators.



"I believe the technology professionals of this nation, like all Americans, are ready to answer the call and do their part," Wyden said. "The formation of a National Emergency Technology Guard will give them that chance and ensure greater safety and stability for our communities and our citizens in the coming days."



Instant-Message Warnings



While Wyden's proposed technology corps will focus on dealing with a natural disaster or attack after it happens, executives at Odigo, an instant messaging company in Israel, said that there was advanced warning of the recent terrorist attacks via IMs to employees.



Odigo vice president of marketing Alex Diamandis told NewsFactor that two people at Odigo's Israeli offices received instant messages regarding the attacks about two hours before they happened.



While Diamandis said he could not discuss the nature or content of the messages, Diamandis said that Israeli and U.S. officials were notified and that investigators interviewed Odigo employees a day or two after the attacks.



Crippling Effect



Meanwhile, Wyden, who has planned hearings on the matter for the science subcommittee next week, said the September 11th attacks on U.S. airliners and landmarks "severely challenged" the communications infrastructure of New York, Washington, D.C., and the rest of the country.



"Wireless telephone networks were severely overloaded and crashed," Wyden said. "Wireless Internet access was suspended. Telephone lines were cut and communications for people literally in communities around the East Coast of the United States came to a standstill."



Wyden added: "Even immediate communications needs of rescue workers, victims, families and aid groups were a struggle to coordinate. The New York Times drew a conclusion that I strongly agree with: there need to be new ways to set up emergency information systems."



Bolstering Tech Readiness



Wyden spokeswoman Lisa Raasch told NewsFactor Network the idea is still being fleshed out, but that the senator had already met with some heads of the high-tech industry, adding that she understood the idea had been "quite well received."



"The idea is that especially when communication is critical to rescue and response, we should make sure there is a reliable backbone and infrastructure there so the important things that need to be done, can be done," Raasch said.



A statement from Wyden said a national volunteer organization of trained and well-coordinated units of IT professionals from leading technology companies ought to be in a position to stand ready with designated computers, satellite dishes, wireless communicators and other equipment to quickly re-create and repair compromised communications and technology infrastructures.



Calling on Companies



Raasch told NewsFactor that Wyden planned to meet with a number of companies including Microsoft (Nasdaq: MSFT) and AOL (NYSE: AOL) to recruit support for the National Emergency Technology (NET) Guard.



"It is a volunteer notion in as much as companies would be asked to provide resources both in equipment and personnel," she said.



Wyden's proposal comes as a number of security experts, federal officials and lawmakers warn that the U.S. and its infrastructure are not prepared for a cyber attack. Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) technology group director Rich Pethia testified Wednesday before U.S. House committee members, telling them the spread of the Nimda computer virus demonstrates how vulnerable the Internet and technology infrastructure is to attack.

al-Qa'ida

Al-Qa'ida(translates to: The Base)


Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK - Services Office)


International Islamic Front for Jihad Against

the Jews and Crusaders


Usama Ibn Ladin / Osama bin Laden

Al-Qa'ida is multi-national, with members from

numerous countries and with a worldwide presence. Senior leaders in the

organization are also senior leaders in other terrorist organizations,

including those designated by the Department of State as foreign terrorist

organizations, such as the Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian

al-Jihad. Al-Qa'ida seeks a global radicalization

of existing Islamic groups and the creation of radical Islamic groups

where none exist.

Al-Qa'ida supports Muslim fighters in Afghanistan,

Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia, Yemen, and now Kosovo. It also

trains members of terrorist organizations from such diverse countries

as the Philippines, Algeria, and Eritrea.

Al-Qa'ida's goal is to "unite all Muslims

and to establish a government which follows the rule of the Caliphs."

Bin Ladin has stated that the only way to establish the Caliphate is by

force. Al-Qa'ida's goal, therefore, is to overthrow

nearly all Muslim governments, which are viewed as corrupt, to drive Western

influence from those countries, and eventually to abolish state boundaries.

Usama Bin Ladin, a multi-millionaire ex-Saudi

financier who is a principal source of funding and direction for Al-Qa'ida,

has been described by the US Government as "one of the most significant

financial sponsors of Islamic extremist activities in the world today."

Usama Bin Ladin was born around 1955 in Jeddah,

Saudi Arabia. He is the youngest son of Muhammad Bin

Ladin, a wealthy Saudi of Yemeni origin and founder of the Bin

Ladin Group, a construction firm heavily involved with Saudi Government

contracts.

Usama Bin Ladin left Saudi Arabia to fight

against the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1979.

He sponsored and led a number of Arabs fighting in Afghanistan

against the Soviets in the 1980s. In the mid-1980s he co-founded the Maktab

al-Khidamat (MAK) or Services Office, to help funnel fighters and money

to the Afghan resistance in Peshawar with the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood

leader Abdallah Azzam. The MAK ultimately established recruitment centers

around the world -- including in the U.S., Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan

-- that enlisted, sheltered, and transported thousands of individuals

from over 50 countries to Afghanistan to

fight the Soviets. It also organized and funded paramilitary training

camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Bin

Ladin imported heavy equipment to cut roads and tunnels and to build

hospitals and storage depots in Afghanistan.

As many as 10,000 Arabs received training and combat experience in Afghanistan.

Of these, nearly half were Saudis, with others including more than 3000

Algerians, 2000 Egyptians, and hundreds of others from Yemen, Sudan, Pakistan,

Syria and other Muslim states.

Bin Ladin split from Azzam in the late 1980s to extend his campaign to

all corners of the globe while Azzam remained focused only on support

to Muslims waging military campaigns. Bin Ladin formed a new organization

in 1988 called Al-Qa'ida -- the military "base." After Azzam

was killed by a car bomb in late 1989, the MAK split, with the extremist

faction joining Bin Ladin's organization. Bin Ladin returned to work in

his family's Jeddah-based construction business after the Soviets withdrew

from Afghanistan in 1989, but he continued his organization to support

opposition movements in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

After Afghanistan, Bin-Ladin ran the Jihad Committee which includes the

Egyptian Islamic Group and the Jihad Organization in Yemen, the Pakistani

al-Hadith group, the Lebanese Partisans League, the Libyan Islamic Group,

Bayt al-Imam Group in Jordan, and the Islamic Group in Algeria. This committee

runs the Islamic Information Observatory center in London, which organizes

media activity for these organizations, and the Advisory and Reformation

Body which also has a bureau in London.

In 1991 he relocated to the Sudan, and in 1994 he was stripped of his

Saudi citizenship after Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen accused him of

supporting subversive groups. Although the Afghan war had ended, Al-Qa'ida

has remained a formidable organization consisting of mujahedin of many

nationalities who had previously fought with Bin Ladin. Many of these

have remained loyal to and continue working with him today.

Sudan harbors a number of terrorist groups, although in May 1996 it expelled

Bin Laden and members of some terrorist groups under Saudi pressure, and

in response to U.S. insistence and to the threat of UN sanctions following

Sudan's alleged complicity in the attempted assassination of Egyptian

President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1995.

Bin Laden quickly returned to Afghanistan

after leaving Sudan, where his support for and participation in Islamic

extremist activities continued. Since departing Sudan he is said to have

changed considerably, suspecting that there are plots to murder him, so

he reportedly now only trusts only a narrow circle of people. He is reported

to act on the premise that attack is the best line of defense, rather

than efforts to unify extremist groups.

Prior to the emergence of the Taleban he was functioning and moving around

freely while Rabbani and Massood ruled in Kabul. Bin Laden was subsequently

reported to be living in Taleban-held Jalalabad in Afghanistan with about

50 of his family members and bodyguards. A few months after his arrival

in Afghanistan the Taleban gained control over Jalalabad and Kabul, and

launched a campaign against the "Arab Afghans." In February

1997 the Taleban rejected an American agreement to turn Bin Ladin over

to them in return for international recognition and obtaining Afghanistan's

seat in international organizations. But in early 1997 at least two large

bombs were detonated in Jalalabad as part of attempts to assassinate Bin Ladin, including a 19 March 1997 explosion that destroy the police station,

killing more than 50 and wounding 150. Bin Ladin subsequently moved to

Kandahar from his Jalalabad stronghold as a result of concerns for his

personal safety. Kandahar is the stronghold of the Students of the Shari'ah's,

and the central residence of the Commander of the Faithful al-Mulla Muhammad

'Umar. The Taleban Islamic State of Afghanistan claimed that they moved

him to Kandahar to keep him under strict limitations [according to some

reports he was under house arrest], and that he was no longer allowed

to use Afghan soil to cause harm to any country, including Saudi Arabia.

Most recently he was reportedly moving between four or five camps in

Afghanistan which are the bases for about 200 followers staying with him.

He has financed and supported some 600 or 700 other people outside Afghanistan.

Bin Laden is said to have established cells of supporters in Yemen, and

as of late 1996 it was reported that an additional 2,000 "Afghans"

were resident in Somalia and the Ogaden region, with relatively few actually

in Afghanistan.

Bin-Ladin provides money to humanitarian organizations and to Islamic

publications and groups. He advocates the destruction of the United States,

which he sees as the chief obstacle to reform in Muslim societies. Since

1996, his anti-U.S. rhetoric has escalated to the point of calling for

worldwide attacks on Americans and allies, including civilians.

Bin-Ladin was involved in operations against the American forces in Somalia

in 1993.


In 1995 it was reported that Bin Ladin had agreed to finance a "Gulf

Battalion" organized by the Iranian Guardians of the Revolution.

It was suggested that he had convinced Yemeni fundamentalist leader Shaykh

'Abd-al-Majid al-Zandani, to position elements of the Gulf Battalion in

al-Zandani's camps in Yemen for deployment in Gulf countries when circumstances

permited.

Osama Bin Laden is suspected by the US of being responsible for 1996 bomb

attacks on American service personnel in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.


In mid-1996 a meeting of various leaders convened by Bin Laden reached

a consensus "to use force to confront all foreign forces stationed

on Islamic land," and to form a planning committee; a financing,

supply, and mobilization committee; and a higher military committee to

oversee implementation of the plan.

Bin Ladin publicly issued his "Declaration of War" against the

United States in August 1996. When anti-U.S. attacks did not materialize

immediately, he explained the delay: "If we wanted to carry out small

operations, it would have been easy to do so immediately after the statements.

Even the nature of the battle requires good preparation."

In November 1996 he pronounced as "praiseworthy terrorism" the

bombings in Riyadh and at Khobar in Saudi Arabia, promising that other

attacks would follow. He admitted carrying out attacks on U.S. military

personnel in Somalia and Yemen, declaring that "we used to hunt them

down in Mogadishu."

He stated in an interview broadcast in February 1997 that "if someone

can kill an American soldier, it is better than wasting time on other

matters."

In February 1998, Bin Ladin announced the creation of a new alliance of

terrorist organizations, the "International Islamic Front for Jihad

Against the Jews and Crusaders." The Front included the Egyptian

al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Harakat ul-Ansar,

and two other groups. The Front declared its intention to attack Americans

and our allies, including civilians, anywhere in the world. By at least

February 1998, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad had effectively merged with

al Qaeda and joined with al Qaeda in targeting American civilians.


In May 1998, he stated at a press conference in Afghanistan

that we would see the results of his threats "in a few weeks."

On 07 August 1998 a car bomb exploded behind the US Embassy, killing 291

persons and wounding about 5,000. The majority of the casualties were

Kenyan citizens. Twelve US citizens died, and six were injured in the

attack. A group calling itself the "Islamic Army for the Liberation

of the Holy Places" immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks

in Nairobi and a near-simultaneous explosion in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

US officials believe the group is a cover name used by Usama

Bin Ladin's al-Qaida organization. Indictments were returned in the

US District Court for the Southern District of New York charging Usama

Bin Ladin and 11 other individuals for these and other terrorist acts

against US citizens. At yearend, four of the indicted- Wadih El Hage,

Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, and Mohammed Sadeeck

Odeh-were being held in New York, while Khalid al-Fawwaz remained in the

United Kingdom pending extradition to the United States. The other suspects

remain at large. The Government of Kenya cooperated closely with the United

States in the criminal investigation of the bombing. On 20 August 1998,

President Clinton amended Executive Order 12947 to add Usama

Bin Ladinand his key associates to the list of terrorists, thus blocking

their US assets-including property and bank accounts-and prohibiting all

US financial transactions with them. Bin Laden remains in Afghanistan

under the protection of the Taliban, an ultra-conservative Islamic militia

that controls most of that country. The United States conducted a bombing

run -- Operation Infinite Reach -- against bin Laden's facilities there

on 20 August 1998.

Bin-Ladin's investments include companies involved in property management,

maritime transport, aircraft rental, public works, contracting and other

commercial activities in a number of countries. His investments in Sudan

include construction and agricultural projects, with other commercial

activities in Somalia, Switzerland, and Luxembourg. His European interests

are managed by lawyers in Switzerland, which makes his financial dealings

and support to terrorism difficult, but not impossible, to follow.

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security

Council on 15 October 1999 demanded that the Afghan faction, known as

the Taliban, turn over Usama bin Laden to appropriate authorities in a

country where he would be brought to justice. In that context, it decided

that on 14 November 1999 all States shall freeze funds and prohibit the

take-off and landing of Taliban-owned aircraft unless or until the Taliban

complies with that demand. Since the Taliban did not comply with this

obligation, the measures of the resolution have entered into effect.

Taliban representatives had stated that they were totally opposed to

terrorism, but that Mr. bin Laden was a guest, that he had become a resident

of Afghanistan prior to the Taliban taking control, and that he no longer

had communication with his followers. At the same time, the official spokesman

of Al-Qaida has stated that they have been supplying fighters to Chechnya.

It seems that they are active not only in Chechnya, but have worried the

other Central Asian republics, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and even Iran.

They are certainly turning up in Kashmir, which is one of the important

flash points in the world. In mid-December 1999 the Jordanian police arrested

members of a cell planning attacks against western tourists. This cell

was linked to Usama bin Laden. On 14 December 1999 Customs agents arrested

an Algerian national smuggling almost 50 pounds of explosive materials

and detonating devices into the United States. The other Algerians subsequently

arrested in connection with this plot apparently were "Afghan alumni,"

trained with the mujahedin in Afghanistan and also linked to Usama bin

Laden.

In testimony 02 February 2000 before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet said Usama

Bin Ladin "is still foremost" among terrorists planning

attacks against the United States and that more than half of 24 terrorists

brought to justice since July 1998 "were associates" of Bin

Ladin's Al-Qa'ida organization. He said

that despite some disruptions, U.S. intelligence officials believe Bin

Ladin could strike without warning, and that the terrorist -- along

with others -- is "placing increased emphasis on developing surrogates

to carry out attacks in an effort to avoid detection."

The United States on 08 May 2000 indicted two Egyptians being held in

London for the deadly bombing of United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya,

and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in August 1998, which resulted in more than

200 deaths and more than 4,000 injuries. The US indictment was filed in

New York City and superceded a previous indictment related to the bombing.

The indictment brought to 17 the total number of persons charged, six

of whom are in custody in the United States and three in the United Kingdom.

DOSSIER: Ossama bin Laden (a.k.a. Ussama bin Ladin)

Name: Osama bin Laden (a.k.a. Usama bin Ladin)


Aliases: Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin, Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin, the Prince, the

Emir, Abu Abdallah, Mujahid Shaykh, Hajj, the Director, the Contractor

Description:


Date of Birth: 1957


Hair: Brown


Place of Birth: Jeddah, Saudi Arabia


Eyes: Brown


Height: 6' 4" to 6' 6"


Complexion: Olive


Weight: Approximately 160 pounds


Sex: Male


Build: Thin


Nationality: Saudi Arabian


Occupations: Unknown


Remarks: Leader of a terrorist organization known as Al-Qaeda "The Base".


He walks with a cane.


Scars and Marks: None





REWARD


The United States Government is offering a reward of up to $5 million for

information leading directly to the apprehension or conviction of Usama Bin

Laden.

Bin Ladin also described his global banking network, naming institutions in

Sudan, Malaysia, Britain, Hong Kong and Dubai.

Information on Osama bin Laden's Family

Al-Qa'ida training facilities exist in:

Philippines, Algeria, Sudan, Afghanistan and Eritrea

Osama bin Laden, the youngest of some twenty surviving sons of one of Saudi

Arabia's wealthiest and most prominent families, a family that ran the largest

construction companies in the Arab world, has 51 siblings and is the scion of

a large, wealthy family whose father was a favored contractor for the Saudi

royal family. Several of Osama's relatives have resided on and off in Boston

during the past decade.

During five years of exile in Sudan, from 1991 to 1996, bin Laden placed his

wealth -- a fortune now estimated at more than two hundred and fifty million

dollars, largely in foreign bank accounts -- at the disposal of militant Islamist

groups around the world. Whether he retains access to his family's fortune,

which is estimated to be worth some five billion dollars, is a matter of dispute.

Idealogically, he is part puritanical Wahhabi, the dominant school of Islam

in Saudi Arabia, yet at one time he may have led a very liberated social life.

He is part feudal Saudi, an aristocrat who, from time to time, would retreat

with his father to the desert and live in a tent. And he is of a Saudi generation

that came of age during the rise of OPEC, with the extraordinary wealth that

accompanied it: a generation whose religious fervor or political zeal, complemented

by government airline tickets, led thousands to fight a war in a distant Muslim

land.

Supports troops in: Afghanistan, Bosnia,

Chechnya, Somalia, Yemen, and now Kosovo as well as central Asian republics,

Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and even Iran.

al-Qa'ida (Bin Ladin's orgainsation),

Harakat ul-Ansar, Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, Hamas, Islamic Jihad

and Hizbullah have agreed to pool their resources to fight their common

enemies, being the United States and Israel. The organisation is called:

"International Islamic Front for Jihad

Against the Jews and Crusaders." It was formed in February 1998.

al-Qa'ida's mission statement: "unite all

Muslims and to establish a government which follows the rule of the Caliphs."

Bin Ladin has stated that the only way to establish the Caliphate is by

force. Al-Qa'ida's goal, therefore, is to overthrow nearly all Muslim

governments, which are viewed as corrupt, to drive Western influence from

those countries, and eventually to abolish state boundaries.

Most recently he was reportedly moving between four or five camps in

Afghanistan which are the bases for about

200 followers staying with him. He has financed and supported some

600 or 700 other people outside Afghanistan. Bin Laden is said to have

established cells of supporters in Yemen, and as of late 1996 it was reported

that an additional 2,000 "Afghans" were resident in Somalia

and the Ogaden region, with relatively few actually in Afghanistan.

Bin-Ladin was involved in operations against the American forces in Somalia

in 1993.


Osama Bin Laden is suspected by the US of being responsible for 1996 bomb

attacks on American service personnel in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.





Bin Ladin publicly issued his "Declaration

of War" against the United States in August 1996.


(all above sources: FAS Intelligence Resource Program, al-Qa'ida press

releases, and U.S. State Department briefings).

One US intelligence officials says: "You break up a cell, and another

one grows. There is no longer one man. If Usama bin Ladin were to fall

off a cliff in Afghanistan, we would all cheer, but his organisation would

still be in place. From his perspective, he's got a 100-year program.

He's probably eight years into it and you can't expect to get too far

in the first 10 years. But he's consolidating Afghanistan. He's fighting

a war in Chechnya that has bled the Russians, and now they're making inroads

in the Philippines and Indonesia." (source: Jane's Report on Bin

Ladin's Activities)

Al-Fadl alleged that Bin Ladin and his associates once tried to buy uranium

from Sudanese black marketeers. US prosecutors also allege that at various

times since 1992, Bin Laden and a top associate have tried to purchase

components to build a nuclear weapon. While it is not clear that Bin Ladin

has the technical expertise or resources to fashion the ultimate terrorist

bomb, experts caution that he could fairly easily build a so-called 'dirty

bomb', a conventional weapon that would shower lethal radioactive material

over a wide area.


(source: Jane's Report on Bin Ladin's Activities)

Click here for a list of offenses the United States attributes to Osama bin Laden

Contact Rizzn's Wartime Factbook

Howdy readers. This is your friendly neighborhood Rizzn here. I've decided to compile the database of information I've been collecting on my hard drive of this brewing war we seem to be getting into now.





If you have information I haven't covered that you think should be included or have comments of any kind, please contact me.





Rizzn Do'Urden


fax: 1.530.869.6594


fone: 1.972.429.8402


email: rizzn@usa.com


yim: rizzn.geo


aim: RznDoUrdn





Contact me!

Afghanistan - General Information

Afghanistan

Afghanistan - People in Power

Introduction

Background: Afghanistan was invaded and occupied by the Soviet Union in 1979.

The USSR was forced to withdraw 10 years later by anti-communist mujahidin forces

supplied and trained by the US, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and others. Fighting

subsequently continued among the various mujahidin factions, but the fundamentalist

Islamic Taliban movement has been able to seize most of the country. In addition

to the continuing civil strife, the country suffers from enormous poverty, a

crumbling infrastructure, and widespread live mines.

Geography

Location: Southern Asia, north and west of Pakistan, east of Iran

Geographic coordinates: 33 00 N, 65 00 E

Map references: Asia

Area:


total: 652,000 sq km


land: 652,000 sq km


water: 0 sq km

Area - comparative: slightly smaller than Texas

Land boundaries:


total: 5,529 km


border countries: China 76 km, Iran 936 km, Pakistan 2,430 km, Tajikistan 1,206

km, Turkmenistan 744 km, Uzbekistan 137 km

Coastline: 0 km (landlocked)

Maritime claims: none (landlocked)

Climate: arid to semiarid; cold winters and hot summers

Terrain: mostly rugged mountains; plains in north and southwest

Elevation extremes:


lowest point: Amu Darya 258 m


highest point: Nowshak 7,485 m

Natural resources: natural gas, petroleum, coal, copper, chromite, talc, barites,

sulfur, lead, zinc, iron ore, salt, precious and semiprecious stones

Land use:


arable land: 12%


permanent crops: 0%


permanent pastures: 46%


forests and woodland: 3%


other: 39% (1993 est.)

Irrigated land: 30,000 sq km (1993 est.)

Natural hazards: damaging earthquakes occur in Hindu Kush mountains; flooding

Environment - current issues: soil degradation; overgrazing; deforestation

(much of the remaining forests are being cut down for fuel and building materials);

desertification

Environment - international agreements:


party to: Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Marine

Dumping, Nuclear Test Ban


signed, but not ratified: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Hazardous Wastes, Law

of the Sea, Marine Life Conservation

Geography - note: landlocked

People

Population: 25,838,797 (July 2000 est.)

Age structure:


0-14 years: 42.37% (male 5,598,403; female 5,371,054)


15-64 years: 54.86% (male 7,362,961; female 6,839,914)


65 years and over: 2.77% (male 378,741; female 337,724) (2000 est.)

Population growth rate: 3.54% (2000 est.)


note: this rate reflects the continued return of refugees from Iran

Birth rate: 41.82 births/1,000 population (2000 est.)

Death rate: 18.01 deaths/1,000 population (2000 est.)

Net migration rate: 11.54 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2000 est.)

Sex ratio:


at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female


under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female


15-64 years: 1.08 male(s)/female


65 years and over: 1.12 male(s)/female


total population: 1.06 male(s)/female (2000 est.)

Infant mortality rate: 149.28 deaths/1,000 live births (2000 est.)

Life expectancy at birth:


total population: 45.88 years


male: 46.62 years


female: 45.1 years (2000 est.)

Total fertility rate: 5.87 children born/woman (2000 est.)

Nationality:


noun: Afghan(s)


adjective: Afghan

Ethnic groups: Pashtun 38%, Tajik 25%, Uzbek 6%, Hazara 19%, minor ethnic groups

(Aimaks, Turkmen, Baloch, and others)

Religions: Sunni Muslim 84%, Shi'a Muslim 15%, other 1%

Languages: Pashtu 35%, Afghan Persian (Dari) 50%, Turkic languages (primarily

Uzbek and Turkmen) 11%, 30 minor languages (primarily Balochi and Pashai) 4%,

much bilingualism

Literacy:


definition: age 15 and over can read and write


total population: 31.5%


male: 47.2%


female: 15% (1999 est.)

Government

Country name:


conventional long form: Islamic State of Afghanistan; note - the self-proclaimed

Taliban government refers to the country as Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan


conventional short form: Afghanistan


local long form: Dowlat-e Eslami-ye Afghanestan


local short form: Afghanestan


former: Republic of Afghanistan

Data code: AF

Government type: no functioning central government, administered by factions

Capital: Kabul

Administrative divisions: 30 provinces (velayat, singular - velayat); Badakhshan,

Badghis, Baghlan, Balkh, Bamian, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Ghowr, Helmand, Herat,

Jowzjan, Kabol, Kandahar, Kapisa, Konar, Kondoz, Laghman, Lowgar, Nangarhar,

Nimruz, Oruzgan, Paktia, Paktika, Parvan, Samangan, Sar-e Pol, Takhar, Vardak,

Zabol


note: there may be two new provinces of Nurestan (Nuristan) and Khowst

Independence: 19 August 1919 (from UK control over Afghan foreign affairs)

National holiday: Victory of the Muslim Nation, 28 April; Remembrance Day for

Martyrs and Disabled, 4 May; Independence Day, 19 August

Constitution: none

Legal system: a new legal system has not been adopted but all factions tacitly

agree they will follow Shari'a (Islamic law)

Suffrage: NA; previously males 15-50 years of age

Executive branch: on 27 September 1996, the ruling members of the Afghan Government

were displaced by members of the Islamic Taliban movement; the Islamic State

of Afghanistan has no functioning government at this time, and the country remains

divided among fighting factions


note: the Taliban have declared themselves the legitimate government of Afghanistan;

however, the UN still recognizes the government of Burhanuddin RABBANI; the

Organization of the Islamic Conference has left the Afghan seat vacant until

the question of legitimacy can be resolved through negotiations among the warring

factions; the country is essentially divided along ethnic lines; the Taliban

controls the capital of Kabul and approximately two-thirds of the country including

the predominately ethnic Pashtun areas in southern Afghanistan; opposing factions

have their stronghold in the ethnically diverse north

Legislative branch: non-functioning as of June 1993

Judicial branch: non-functioning as of March 1995, although there are local

Shari'a (Islamic law) courts throughout the country

Political parties and leaders: Harakat-i-Islami (Islamic Movement) [Mohammed

Asif MOHSENI]; Harakat-Inqilab-i-Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Movement) [Mohammad

Nabi MOHAMMADI]; Hizbi Islami-Gulbuddin (Islamic Party) [Gulbuddin HIKMATYAR

faction]; Hizbi Islami-Khalis (Islamic Party) [Yunis KHALIS faction]; Hizbi

Wahdat-Akbari faction (Islamic Unity Party) [Mohammad Akbar AKBARI]; Ittihad-i-Islami

Barai Azadi Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan) [Abdul

Rasul SAYYAF]; Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan (Afghanistan National Liberation

Front) [Sibghatullah MOJADDEDI]; Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami (National Islamic Front)

[Sayed Ahamad GAILANI]; Taliban (Religious Students Movement) [Mohammad OMAR];

United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan comprised of Jumbesh-i-Melli

Islami (National Islamic Movement) [Abdul Rashid DOSTAM]; Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic

Society) [Burhanuddin RABBANI and Ahmad Shah MASOOD]; and Hizbi Wahdat-Khalili

faction (Islamic Unity Party) [Abdul Karim KHALILI]

Political pressure groups and leaders: Afghan refugees in Pakistan, Australia,

US, and elsewhere have organized politically; Mellat (Social Democratic Party)

[leader NA]; Peshawar, Pakistan-based groups such as the Coordination Council

for National Unity and Understanding in Afghanistan or CUNUA [Ishaq GAILANI];

tribal elders represent traditional Pashtun leadership; Writers Union of Free

Afghanistan or WUFA [A. Rasul AMIN]

International organization participation: AsDB, CP, ECO, ESCAP, FAO, G-77,

IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Intelsat, IOC,

IOM (observer), ITU, NAM, OIC, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WFTU, WHO,

WMO, WToO

Diplomatic representation in the US:


note: embassy operations suspended 21 August 1997


chief of mission: Ambassador (vacant)


chancery: 2341 Wyoming Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008


telephone: [1] (202) 234-3770


FAX: [1] (202) 328-3516


consulate(s) general: New York

Diplomatic representation from the US: the US embassy in Kabul has been closed

since January 1989 due to security concerns

Flag description: three equal horizontal bands of green (top), white, and black

with a gold emblem centered on the three bands; the emblem features a temple-like

structure with Islamic inscriptions above and below, encircled by a wreath on

the left and right and by a bolder Islamic inscription above, all of which are

encircled by two crossed scimitars


note: the Taliban uses a plain white flag

Economy

Economy - overview: Afghanistan is an extremely poor, landlocked country, highly

dependent on farming and livestock raising (sheep and goats). Economic considerations

have played second fiddle to political and military upheavals during two decades

of war, including the nearly 10-year Soviet military occupation (which ended

15 February 1989). During that conflict one-third of the population fled the

country, with Pakistan and Iran sheltering a combined peak of more than 6 million

refugees. In early 1999, 1.2 million Afghan refugees remained in Pakistan and

about 1.4 million in Iran. Gross domestic product has fallen substantially over

the past 20 years because of the loss of labor and capital and the disruption

of trade and transport. The majority of the population continues to suffer from

insufficient food, clothing, housing, and medical care. Inflation remains a

serious problem throughout the country. International aid can deal with only

a fraction of the humanitarian problem, let alone promote economic development.

The economic situation did not improve in 1998-99, as internal civil strife

continued, hampering both domestic economic policies and international aid efforts.

Numerical data are likely to be either unavailable or unreliable. Afghanistan

was by far the largest producer of opium poppies in 1999, and narcotics trafficking

is a major source of revenue.

GDP: purchasing power parity - $21 billion (1999 est.)

GDP - real growth rate: NA%

GDP - per capita: purchasing power parity - $800 (1999 est.)

GDP - composition by sector:


agriculture: 53%


industry: 28.5%


services: 18.5% (1990)

Population below poverty line: NA%

Household income or consumption by percentage share:


lowest 10%: NA%


highest 10%: NA%

Inflation rate (consumer prices): NA%

Labor force: 8 million (1997 est.)

Labor force - by occupation: agriculture 68%, industry 16%, services 16% (1980

est.)

Unemployment rate: 8% (1995 est.)

Budget:


revenues: $NA


expenditures: $NA, including capital expenditures of $NA

Industries: small-scale production of textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer,

and cement; handwoven carpets; natural gas, oil, coal, copper

Electricity - production: 430 million kWh (1998)

Electricity - production by source:


fossil fuel: 41.86%


hydro: 58.14%


nuclear: 0%


other: 0% (1998)

Electricity - consumption: 510 million kWh (1998)

Electricity - exports: 0 kWh (1998)

Electricity - imports: 110 million kWh (1998)

Agriculture - products: opium poppies, wheat, fruits, nuts, karakul pelts;

wool, mutton

Exports: $80 million (does not include opium) (1996 est.)

Exports - commodities: opium, fruits and nuts, handwoven carpets, wool, cotton,

hides and pelts, precious and semi-precious gems

Exports - partners: FSU, Pakistan, Iran, Germany, India, UK, Belgium, Luxembourg,

Czech Republic

Imports: $150 million (1996 est.)

Imports - commodities: capital goods, food and petroleum products; most consumer

goods

Imports - partners: FSU, Pakistan, Iran, Japan, Singapore, India, South Korea,

Germany

Debt - external: $5.5 billion (1996 est.)

Economic aid - recipient: US provided about $70 million in humanitarian assistance

in 1997; US continues to contribute to multilateral assistance through the UN

programs of food aid, immunization, land mine removal, and a wide range of aid

to refugees and displaced persons

Currency: 1 afghani (AF) = 100 puls

Exchange rates: afghanis (Af) per US$1 - 4,700 (January 2000), 4,750 (February

1999), 17,000 (December 1996), 7,000 (January 1995), 1,900 (January 1994), 1,019

(March 1993), 850 (1991); note - these rates reflect the free market exchange

rates rather than the official exchange rate, which was fixed at 50.600 afghanis

to the dollar until 1996, when it rose to 2,262.65 per dollar, and finally became

fixed again at 3,000.00 per dollar in April 1996

Fiscal year: 21 March - 20 March

Communications

Telephones - main lines in use: 31,200 (1983); note - there were 21,000 main

lines in use in Kabul in 1998

Telephones - mobile cellular: NA

Telephone system:


domestic: very limited telephone and telegraph service; in 1997, telecommunications

links were established between Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and

Kabul through satellite and microwave systems


international: satellite earth stations - 1 Intelsat (Indian Ocean) linked only

to Iran and 1 Intersputnik (Atlantic Ocean region); commercial satellite telephone

center in Ghazni

Radio broadcast stations: AM 7 (6 are inactive; the active station is in Kabul),

FM 1, shortwave 1 (broadcasts in Pushtu, Dari, Urdu, and English) (1999)

Radios: 167,000 (1999)

Television broadcast stations: at least 10 (one government run central television

station in Kabul and regional stations in nine of the 30 provinces; the regional

stations operate on a reduced schedule; also, in 1997, there was a station in

Mazar-e Sharif reaching four northern Afghanistan provinces) (1998)

Televisions: 100,000 (1999)

Internet Service Providers (ISPs): NA

Transportation

Railways:


total: 24.6 km


broad gauge: 9.6 km 1.524-m gauge from Gushgy (Turkmenistan) to Towraghondi;

15 km 1.524-m gauge from Termiz (Uzbekistan) to Kheyrabad transshipment point

on south bank of Amu Darya

Highways:


total: 21,000 km


paved: 2,793 km


unpaved: 18,207 km (1998 est.)

Waterways: 1,200 km; chiefly Amu Darya, which handles vessels up to about 500

DWT

Pipelines: petroleum products - Uzbekistan to Bagram and Turkmenistan to Shindand;

natural gas 180 km

Ports and harbors: Kheyrabad, Shir Khan

Airports: 46 (1999 est.)

Airports - with paved runways:


total: 14


over 3,047 m: 3


2,438 to 3,047 m: 4


1,524 to 2,437 m: 4


914 to 1,523 m: 1


under 914 m: 2 (1999 est.)

Airports - with unpaved runways:


total: 32


2,438 to 3,047 m: 5


1,524 to 2,437 m: 13


914 to 1,523 m: 3


under 914 m: 11 (1999 est.)

Heliports: 3 (1999 est.)

Military

Military branches: NA; note - the military does not exist on a national basis;

some elements of the former Army, Air and Air Defense Forces, National Guard,

Border Guard Forces, National Police Force (Sarandoi), and tribal militias still

exist but are factionalized among the various groups

Military manpower - military age: 22 years of age

Military manpower - availability:


males age 15-49: 6,401,980 (2000 est.)

Military manpower - fit for military service:


males age 15-49: 3,432,236 (2000 est.)

Military manpower - reaching military age annually:


males: 244,958 (2000 est.)

Military expenditures - dollar figure: $NA

Military expenditures - percent of GDP: NA%

Transnational Issues

Disputes - international: support to Islamic militants worldwide by some factions;

question over which group should hold Afghanistan's seat at the UN

Illicit drugs: world's largest illicit opium producer, surpassing Burma (potential

production in 1999 - 1,670 metric tons; cultivation in 1999 - 51,500 hectares,

a 23% increase over 1998); a major source of hashish; increasing number of heroin-processing

laboratories being set up in the country; major political factions in the country

profit from drug trade